[56], At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (163340N 1063755E / 16.561N 106.632E / 16.561; 106.632), across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations. The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ. The exact number of casualties suffered by both sides during the Khe Sanh battle is very difficult to ascertain, given that in many cases the two warring factions provided their own disparate counts. The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations and not geographic location. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". The Battle of Khe Sanh began Jan. 21, 1968, with inconclusive ground activity by US and North Vietnamese patrols. Taking a larger but more realistic view, the Khe Sanh campaign resulted in a death toll of American military personnel that approached 1,000. [42], In the wake of the hill fights, a lull in PAVN activity occurred around Khe Sanh. From the Hu site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. The official assessment of the North Vietnamese Army dead is just over 1,600 killed, with two . If only it had contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines. Aug 23, 2013. The fire of PAVN antiaircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempt. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks of the 203rd Armored Regiment churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment, both elements of the 304th Division. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have distracted American and South Vietnamese attention from the buildup of Viet Cong (VC) forces in the south before the early 1968 Tet Offensive. [48][Note 4], Not all leading Marine officers, however, had the same opinion. The Battle of Khe Sanh took place between January 21 and July 9, 1968; however, most of the official statistics provided pertain only to Operation Scotland, which ended on March 31, or to the 77-day period beginning what is classified as the Siege of Khe Sanh, where the 26th Marines were pinned down until Operations Niagara, and Pegasus freed [62], On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments (the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local force units. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. [12] With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam". On the morning of 22 January Lownds decided to evacuate the remaining forces in the village with most of the Americans evacuated by helicopter while two advisers led the surviving local forces overland to the combat base. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. Johnson backed the Marine position due to his concern over protecting the Army's air assets from Air Force co-option. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. [10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat. Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January - 9 April 1968) Max Hastings wrote a bestseller on Vietnam, and Dan met him to discuss Domino theory, whether it was possible for the US to win the war and the effect the war had on those who fought in it. U.S. Marines and their allies killed thousands of NVA, but to solve the riddle of Khe Sanh, you have to recount the numbers. Declassified documents show that in response, Westmoreland considered using nuclear weapons. The figures of 5,500 NVA dead and 1,000 U.S. dead yield a ratio of 5.5:1. [47][Note 3] Westmoreland regarded the choice as quite simple. [80] Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White operation to assist in the Marine defense. The Marines suffered 155 killed in action and 425 wounded. [125], By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector. The United States and its South Vietnamese allies pulled many huge offensive . [112][113][114] In addition, over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh. Known as the McNamara Line, it was initially codenamed "Project Nine". Military History Institute of Vietnam, p. 222. It was a bad beginning to a long 77-day siege. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, microwave/tropospheric scatter technology, "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in May 1968", "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in June 1968", https://web.archive.org/web/20080215233328/http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3029941.html?featured=y&c=y, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, https://www.historynet.com/the-withdrawal-from-khe-sanh/?f, "Khe Sanh: 6,000 Marines Dug In for Battle", "The US's secret plan to nuke Vietnam, Laos", "Memorandum for the President, 19 February 1968", "Battlefields of Khe Sanh: Still One Casualty a Day", "The US Army Quartermaster Air Delivery Units and the Defense of Khe Sanh", "5 things you didn't know about Khe Sanh", "Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Battalion 4th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971", "Narrative of Events of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) During LAM SON 719", United States Army Center of Military History, Bibliography: The Tet Offensive and the Battle of Khe Sanh, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Khe_Sanh&oldid=1142289112. [30], In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive line south of the DMZ, in northern Qung Tr Province. MN: 05-12-1968: Vietnam: Army: 2: [61] To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another manning Hill 861A. I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's attention away from the greatest area of threat, the northern part of I Corps. American logistical, aerial, and artillery support was provided to the operation. Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." PAVN forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, then began planning for incursion into Laos, and in October, the construction of an airfield at Khe Sanh was completed. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would launch a ground assault from Ca Lu Combat Base (16km east of Khe Sanh) and head west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover the Marine advance. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. Taking place between March and July 1970, the Battle of Fire. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at Khe Sanh Combat Base, killing Lance Corp. Jerry Stenberg and other Marines. On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again, the ammunition dump was detonated. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records claim that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. The NVA continued shelling the base, and on July 1 launched a company-sized infantry attack against its perimeter. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. MACV therefore initiated an operation to open Route 9 to vehicle traffic. Battle of la Drang Valley (26 October - 27 . Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks. [147] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good. The Marines claimed 115 PAVN killed, while their own casualties amounted to 10 dead, 100 wounded, and two missing. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. Both sides have published official histories of the battle, and while these histories agree the fighting took place at Khe Sanh, they disagree on virtually every other aspect of it. Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. [138], On the following day, the 2nd Brigade captured the old French fort near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (6070,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. "[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. [172], On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II, which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying of KSCB as a forward supply base for Operation Lam Son 719. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. [12] Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from the area on 11 July. Seven miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, and about halfway to the Laotian border, sat the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. The official, public estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese KIA stands in contrast to another estimate made by the American military. [115] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. [88] Westmoreland was so obsessed with the tactical situation that he threatened to resign if his wishes were not obeyed. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. The Battle of Ban Houei Sane, not the attack three weeks later at Lang Vei, marked the first time that the PAVN had committed an armored unit to battle. Making the prospect even more enticing was that the base was in an unpopulated area in which American firepower could be fully employed without civilian casualties. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN finally withdrew. [75], Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara II, was launched on the 21st,[76] the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. The latest microwave/tropospheric scatter technology enabled them to maintain communications at all times. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half of all US combat troops, nearly 50 maneuver battalions, to I Corps. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. Battle of Khe Sanh The attack finally came on January 21, 1968, when PAVN forces began a massive artillery bombardment of Khe Sanh, hitting the base's main store of ammunition and destroying. Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh by Murphy, Edward F. (mass_market) at the best online prices at eBay! server. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. [85] Westmoreland had given his deputy commander for air operations, Air Force General William W. Momyer, the responsibility for coordinating all air assets during the operation to support KSCB. But Pisor also pointed out that 205 is a completely false number. One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. He made his final appearance in the story of Khe Sanh on 23 May, when his regimental sergeant major and he stood before President Johnson and were presented with a Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the 26th Marines. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry Regiment was one of the racially segregated units of the United States Army known as Buffalo Soldiers.The 25th served from 1866 to 1957, seeing action in the American Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, Philippine-American War and World War II. On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu. Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. He subsequently ordered the US military to hold Khe Sanh at all costs. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. Officer casualties of all branches were overwhelmingly white. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement.
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